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Abstract The paper is devoted to Poincare´’s work in
probability. The starting point for the discussion is Poin-
care´’s intervention in the Dreyfus Affair. Although works
on probability do not represent a large part of the mathe-
matician’s achievements, they provide significant insight
into the evolution of Poincare´’s thought on several
important matters, such as the changes in physics implied
by statistical mechanics and molecular theories. The gen-
eral historical context of this evolution is presented.
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In 1906, Poincare´ signed one of the most unusual texts of
his scientific career [10], a report written for the Cour de
Cassation in order to close the Dreyfus Affair. In 1904,
10 years after the condemnation and demotion of the
unfortunate captain and all that had followed, the French
government had decided to bring to an end this lamentable
story, which had torn French society for years, and
obtained the rehabilitation of the young officer who had
been so unjustly martyred. As is well known, the accusa-
tion of 1894 had been proclaimed despite a total absence of
material proof, during a hasty and biased trial complacently
orchestrated by the military hierarchy, whose aim was to
provide a culprit as soon as possible. The only concrete
document was the famous bordereau found in a wastepaper
basket in the German Embassy in Paris and briefly scruti-
nized by several experts of greater or lesser competence.
Among them, Alphonse Bertillon played a specially sin-
ister role, and afterwards he became Dreyfus’s most
obstinate accuser. He built a bizarre edifice of self-fabri-
cation (autoforgerie) of the bordereau, a theory having a
pseudo-scientific presentation, in order to prove the guilt of
the innocent captain. Bertillon became trapped by his own
conviction, more out of self-confidence and stupidity than
from a real partisan spirit. When the Affair broke out at the
end of the 1890s, and the political plot became obvious and
Dreyfus’s innocence apparent, Bertillon unceasingly com-
plicated his theory to prove Dreyfus’s guilt. This frenzy
resulted in an avalanche of troubles for him and came close
to ending his career in the Paris Police department. How-
ever, for the trial in the Cour de Cassation, in order to
silence any last dissenting voices which might be raised, it
was decided not to ignore Bertillon’s rantings, but to ask
experts of unquestionable academic authority to give their
opinion about the possible value of the self-proclaimed
expert’s conclusions. Three mathematicians were called for
that purpose, Paul Appell, Gaston Darboux and Henri Po-
incare´, who jointly signed the report for the Cour de
Cassation in 1906. Nevertheless, everybody knew that only
Poincare´ had actually worked on the document, a tedious
task he undertook with honesty but not without complaint.
Besides, this was not Poincare´’s first intervention in the
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Dreyfus case: in 1899, Painleve´, who came to Rennes to
give evidence at the trial reviewing the 1894 judgement of
the court-martial, had read from the witness box a letter of
Poincare´ in which he expressed a harsh opinion about the
lack of scientific foundation for Bertillon’s work.
This story is well known and has been narrated in detail
many times [13, 14, 29] and I shall not dwell on it further.
However, one may ask why Poincare´ had been called for
this task. A first answer immediately comes to mind: in
1906, Poincare´, then fifty-two, was without a doubt the
most prominent of French scientists. He had moreover
another characteristic: his name was familiar to a sizeable
audience outside the scientific community. It was well
known that he won the important prize of the King Oscar II
of Sweden in 1889; the publication of semi-popular books
on the interpretation of science brought him real popular-
ity, and he was also famous due to several papers which
appeared in newspapers, for instance during the Interna-
tional Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900, at
which Poincare´ had been the main authority. To call on
such a personage in order to quash the insignificant but
noisy Bertillon was therefore a logical calculation on the
part the government. However, a second and more hidden
reason probably played also a part. The report for the Cour
de Cassation [10] opens with a chapter whose title was
quite original in judicial literature: Notions sur la prob-
abilite´ des causes (Notions on the probability of causes); it
contains a brief exposition of the principles of the Bayesian
method. Bertillon had indeed pretended to build his system
on the methods and results of the theory of probability, and
seriously answering him was only possible by confronting
the so-called expert with his own weapons. It was therefore
necessary not only to call a scientific star for the job, but
also someone whose authority in these matters could not be
challenged. In 1906, Poincare´ was unquestionably regarded
by everyone as the leading specialist in the mathematics of
randomness in France. It is true that at the time he no
longer held chair of the calculus of probability and math-
ematical physics at the Sorbonne, but he had held it for
some 10 years (it was in fact the first position he obtained
in Paris), had accomplished an impressive amount of work
in mathematical physics during this period (we shall return
at length to this subject later) and had published in 1896,
shortly before leaving the chair, a textbook on the calculus
of probability which, in 1906, was still the primary text-
book on the subject in French. Moreover, several publi-
cations had presented his ideas on the presence of
randomness in modern physics to a large cultivated audi-
ence, in particular his Science and Hypothesis [23], which
enjoyed a great success. It was therefore as a specialist in
the calculus of probability that Poincare´ was called by the
judicial authorities, to help them to finally dispose of the
Drefyus case.
If we go back in time 15 years before this event, we
cannot but be struck by a contrast. Since 1886, although
Poincare´ held the Sorbonne chair just mentioned, there is
no doubt that he essentially focussed on the part of math-
ematical physics. For instance, he had signed several
publications with the qualification Henri Poincare´, pro-
fesseur de Physique mathe´matique. In 1892, he published
an important textbook on thermodynamics [16] based on
the lectures he had given at the Sorbonne several years
before. Naturally, no publication by Poincare´ ever went
unnoticed, and one attentive reader had been the Scottish
physicist Peter Guthrie Tait (1831–1901). Tait had been
very close to Maxwell and was one of the most enthusiastic
followers of his work. He wrote a review of Poincare´’s
book for the journal Nature [31]; the review was quite
negative despite the obvious talent Tait recognized in his
young French colleague. In Tait’s criticisms of Poincare´’s
book, we can recognize a comment sometimes aimed by
Anglo-Saxon scientists at the works of their French coun-
terparts (who, whenever possible, never missed an oppor-
tunity to respond in kind): to put it briefly, the Anglo-
Saxons often think that the French are too formalist and
remote from experiment, or even despise it, while the
French think that the Anglo-Saxons are too obsessed with a
practical approach to problems, without reflecting enough
on the underlying tectonic structure. Thus, according to
Tait, Poincare´ introduced beautiful and complex mathe-
matical theories in his textbook but often to the detriment
of the physical meaning of the situations he studied. The
most important reproach of the English physicist was the
fact that Poincare´ remained absolutely silent about the
statistical theories of thermodynamics, leaving in the
shadows the works of Tait’s friend and master Maxwell.
Tait wrote:
But the most unsatisfactory part of the whole work is,
it seems to us, the entire ignoration of the true (i.e. the
statistical) basis of the Second Law of Thermody-
namics. According to Clerk-Maxwell (Nature, xvii.
278) ‘‘The touch-stone of a treatise on Thermody-
namics is what is called the Second Law.’’ We need
not quote the very clear statement which follows this,
as it is probably accessible to all our readers. It cer-
tainly has not much resemblance to what will be
found on the point in M. Poincare´’s work: so little,
indeed, that if we were to judge by these two writings
alone it would appear that, with the exception of the
portion treated in the recent investigations of v.
Helmholtz, the science had been retrograding, cer-
tainly not advancing, for the last 20 years.
Poincare´ wrote an answer and sent it to Nature on 24
February 1892. It was followed, during the first semester of
1892, by six other letters between Tait and Poincare´; the
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tones used are rather sharp, each sticking to his position.
On 17 March, Poincare´ wrote the following comment about
the main criticism made by Tait:
I left completely aside a mechanical explanation of
the principle of Clausius that M. Tait calls ‘‘the true
(i.e. statistical) basis of the Second Law of Thermo-
dynamics.’’ I did not speak about this explanation,
which besides seems to me rather unsatisfactory,
because I desired to remain absolutely outside all the
molecular hypotheses, as ingenious they may be; and
in particular I said nothing about the kinetic theory of
gases.1
We can thus see that Poincare´, in 1892, had a very
negative vision of statistical mechanics, the field where the
principal emergence of probabilities in the description of
matter was located at the end of nineteenth century. How-
ever, Poincare´ would not have been Poincare´ if, once shown
a difficulty, he did not take the bull by the horns and to try to
tame it. A first decision was the resolution, during the next
academic year 1893, to teach the kinetic theory of gases to
his students. And indeed, in the Sorbonne syllabus for that
year, we see that Poincare´ had transformed his lectures into
Thermodynamics and the kinetic theory of gases.
In 1894 Poincare´’s published his first paper on the
kinetic theory of gases [20], to which we shall return later.
If one still observes a good deal of skepticism in it, or at
least reservation about these novelties in randomness, a
change of attitude was taking place. This same academic
year 1893–1894, Poincare´ eventually decided for the first
time to teach a course on the calculus of probability at the
Sorbonne. This was the subsequent basis of his book of
1896, the same year when he exchanged his chair for the
chair of celestial mechanics. Moreover, in the years that
followed reflections on the mathematics of randomness
appeared more frequently in his writings, up to the publi-
cation of his more philosophical works, which acknowl-
edged the integration of the theory of probability into
Poincare´’s kit of mathematical tools. By 1906, as already
noted, the transition had been completed, especially as new
elements, such as Einstein’s newly published theory of
Brownian motion, made the increasing presence of prob-
ability in scientific theories even more necessary.
Here I will discuss the probabilistic aspects of Poin-
care´’s enormous production, aspects which comprise a
rather limited part of his enormous output. One significant
challenge in dealing with this subject is that probability
penetrated Poincare´’s work almost by force, forcing his
hand several times, his main achievement consisting in
building dykes so that the mathematician might venture
with a dry foot onto this rather marshy terrain. His suc-
cessor Borel had a somewhat different attitude toward
choosing to apply probability theory in many domains,
reflecting the fact that Borel had encountered probability in
a more spectacular way than Poincare´ (see [11]).
Despite this limited contribution, Poincare´ succeeded in
leaving a significant legacy which would later prove
important. Above all, his most decisive influence may have
been to allow probability theory to regain its prestige in
France again, after its rather miserable position in the
French academic world for more than half a century.
We shall take a closer look at the evolution of Poin-
care´’s thinking in the 15 years that have just been men-
tioned, in the attempt to understand how was this gradual
taming of mathematical randomness came about. Poin-
care´’s life and writings made (and for sure will make again)
a lot of ink flow. It will therefore not surprise anyone that
many of the topics discussed in the present paper have
already been discussed several times before. In particular, I
shall refer several times to Sheynin’s text [30], to von
Plato’s publications [32, 33], to the book [8], as well as to
several papers by Bru, some published and some not [5, 6].
In the beginning was the Chair. As we will see, it was
not only by through fortuitous scientific interest that Po-
incare´ first came to be involved in probability theory, but
also as a result of a very specific academic situation in
which Hermite, the major mathematical authority in 1880s
France, crusaded for the career of his three ‘mathematical
stars’: Paul Appel (his nephew), Emile Picard (his son-in-
law) and of course Henri Poincare´, who Hermite consid-
ered the most brilliant of the three, though he did not
belong to his family (to the great displeasure, so he wrote
to Mittag–Leffler, of Madame Hermite). A remarkable
change took place at the Sorbonne at this time: in the space
of just a few years, almost every holder of the existing
chairs in mathematics and physics died—Liouville and
Briot in 1882, Puiseux in 1883, Bouquet and Desains in
1885, Jamin in 1886—leaving an open field for a specta-
cular change in the professorships. By the end of the
whirlwind, the average age of the professors of mathe-
matics and physics at the Sorbonne had been reduced by
18 years! It was therefore clear for everyone, and first of all
Hermite, that there was a risk that the situation might
become fixed for a long time, and that it was therefore
necessary to act swiftly and resolutely in favor of his
prote´ge´s. The three of them were, indeed, appointed in
Paris during these years. This episode is narrated in detail
in [1] and here I will touch on only the most important
aspects insofar as they relate to our story.
1 ‘J’ai laisse´ comple`tement de coˆte´ une explication me´canique du
principe de Clausius que M. Tait appelle ‘‘the true (i.e. statistical)
basis of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.’’ Je n’ai pas parle´ de
cette explication, qui me paraıˆt d’ailleurs assez peu satisfaisante,
parce que je de´sirais rester comple`tement en dehors de toutes les
hypothe`ses mole´culaires quelque inge´nieuses qu’elles puissent eˆtre;
et en particulier j’ai passe´ sous silence la the´orie cine´tique des gaz’.
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The chair of calculus of probability and mathematical
physics, occupied until 1882 by Briot, had been created
some 30 years before, after numerous unsuccessful
attempts by Poisson at creating it, but in a form different
than the one he had hoped for. The joining of mathematical
physics to probability had been decided in order to temper
the bad reputation of the theory of probability in the 1840s
in France, due in large measure to some of the works of
Laplace and, above all, to Poisson himself dealing with the
application of probability in the judicial domain. The book
by Poisson [28] ignited a dispute in the Academy in 1836,
when Dupin and Poinsot harshly contested Poisson’s con-
clusions, and the philosophers led by Victor Cousin made a
scene au nom des droits sacre´s de la liberte´ contre les
pre´tensions avance´es par les mathe´maticiens pour calculer
comment survient un e´ve´nement dans le domaine moral (in
the name of the sacred rights of liberty against the claims
advanced by the mathematicians in order to explain how
events occur in the moral domain). John Stuart Mill sum-
med it up by referring to the application of probability to
judicial problems as the ‘scandal of mathematics’. This
polemical contretemps tarred the calculus of probability in
France, leaving it with a most dubious reputation.
Though Lippmann was nominated for the chair in 1885,
Jamin’s unexpected demise liberated the chair of research
in physics, which Lippmann took over immediately, leav-
ing a position free for Poincare´. One might be initially
surprised by this choice, first of all because Poincare´ was
preferred to other candidates, less gifted of course, but
whose area of research was closer to that of the position.
One would rather have expected, for instance, to see Po-
incare´ in one of the chairs of analysis. In 1882, when Briot
died and the great game began, Poincare´ had no published
work in physics (let alone the calculus of probability),
while among the candidates who were eliminated, there
was for instance Boussinesq, who had significant contri-
butions in that domain to his credit, and who openly stated
his intention of revitalizing the teaching of probability,
which seemed to him to be in a poor state. Not without
irony, Boussinesq would be later Poincare´’s successor in
this same chair when Poincare´ moved to the chair of
celestial mechanics.
Thus Poincare´ was nominated in 1886, without any real
title for the position, and one may think that it had really
been chance which led him there. However, as shown in
Atten’s fine analysis [1], a number of indications demon-
state that Poincare´ had indeed desired this particular posi-
tion. An examination of his lectures in 1887–1888 shows
that he already possessed a profound knowledge of phys-
ical theories and, moreover, several passages in his corre-
spondence at this time show his sustained interest in
questions of physics. This shows that his attitude had not
been purely opportunistic and that the chair pleased him.
Also, Hermite, apart from the desire to support his prote´ge´,
seems to have made a thoughtful bet in nominating him for
this somewhat unexpected position. Knowing Poincare´’s
acute mind, it was not unreasonable to anticipate specta-
cular achievements by him in this position. What followed,
as we know, bore out Hermite’s expectations.
The theory of probability, as I said, did not seem to
concern the new professor at the beginning of his tenure,
and he taught courses on several different physical theories.
In 1892, he published his lectures on thermodynamics
delivered in 1888–1889 [16], a book, as noted earlier, that
was sharply criticized by Tait. Poincare´ therefore decided
to look into the questions raised by the kinetic theory of
gases, in particular because he had just read a communi-
cation by Lord Kelvin to the Royal Society containing
several fundamental criticisms on Maxwell’s theory [12].
Perhaps Poincare´ had been especially eager to read this
paper because it might provide a powerful argument in his
controversy with Tait. However, the affair took another
direction, revealing the mathematician’s profound scien-
tific honesty. At the beginning of the paper [20], published
in 1894, though he again expressed some skepticism, Po-
incare´, whose conventionalism was formed during these
years, already seemed half convinced of the possible
fecundity of Maxwell’s theory.
Does this theory deserve the efforts the English
devoted to it? One may sometimes ask the question; I
doubt that, right now, it may explain all the facts we
know. But the question is not to know if it is true; this
word does not have any meaning when this kind of
theory is concerned. The question is to know whether
its fecundity is exhausted or if it can still help to
make discoveries. And admittedly we cannot forget
that it was useful to M. Crookes in his research on
radiant matter and also to the inventors of the osmotic
pressure. One can therefore still make use of the
kinetic hypothesis, as long as one is not fooled by it.2
In this article Poincare´ proposed a new formulation of the
ergodic principle, introducing the restriction of exceptional
initial states. The most interesting point is that Poincare´
seemed to come up with this idea in his previous work on
the three body problem, which had earned him the prize of
the King of Sweden. In the memoir presented for the prize,
2 ‘Cette the´orie me´rite-t-elle les efforts que les Anglais y ont
consacre´s ? On peut quelquefois se le demander; je doute que, de`s a`
pre´sent, elle puisse rendre compte de tous les faits connus. Mais il ne
s’agit pas de savoir si elle est vraie; ce mot en ce qui concerne une
the´orie de ce genre n’a aucun sens. Il s’agit de savoir si sa fe´condite´
est e´puise´e ou si elle peut encore aider a` faire de`s de´couvertes. Or, on
ne saurait oublier qu’elle a e´te´ utile a` M. Crookes dans ses travaux
sur la matie`re radiante ainsi qu’aux inventeurs de la pression
osmotique. On peut donc encore se servir de l’hypothe`se cine´tique,
pourvu qu’on n’en soit pas dupe’ [18, p. 513].
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he had indeed proved a recurrence theorem concerning the
existence of trajectories such that the system comes back an
infinite number of times in any region of the space, no
matter how small. The next year, for his paper in Acta
Mathematica, Poincare´ added a probabilistic extension of
his theorem where he showed that the set of initial condi-
tions for which the trajectories come back only a finite
number of times in the selected region has probability zero
[15, pp. 71–72]; this passage was included some years later
in his treatise of new methods for celestial mechanics [17–
19] in a section simply called ‘Probabilities’.
During the academic year 1893–1894, Poincare´ pre-
pared his first course of probability for his students of
mathematical physics, published in 1896 and transcribed
by Albert Quiquet, a former student of the Ecole Normale
Supe´rieure who entered the institution in 1883, before
becoming an actuary, and who had probably been an
attentive listener of the master’s voice [21]. In the manner
of the standard probability textbooks of the time, it does
not present a unified theoretical body but rather a series of
questions that Poincare´ tried to answer (the main ones,
which occupy the bulk of the volume, concern the theory
of errors of measurement). The book, in its edition of
1896, is a natural successor to Bertrand’s textbook [3],
which had been the usual textbook of reference up to then
(see [7]). Compared it to Bertrand’s book, Poincare´’s book
consolidates the material in several interesting ways, an
aspect that is even more apparent in the second edition
[26], completed by Poincare´ some months before his death
in 1912.
Poincare´ now seemed convinced that it was no longer
possible to get rid of probability altogether in science, so he
decided instead to make the theory as acceptable as pos-
sible to the scientist. Poincare´ devoted considerable effort
towards this end, especially by writing several texts lying
half-way between popularization (with the meaning of
writing a description of several modern concepts using as
little technical and specialized language as possible) and
innovation. Two of them are of particular importance: that
of 1899 [22]—reprinted as a chapter of [23]—and that of
1907 [24]—reprinted first as [25] and then as a Preface for
the second edition of his textbook [26]. These two texts
signal Poincare´’s desire to show off his new probabilistic
credo. But one has to realize that Poincare´ wanted above all
to convince himself, leading to the question Jean-Paul Pier
used ironically as the title for his paper [27]: did Poincare´
believe in the calculus of probability? Without pretending
to give a definitive answer, one may observe that Poincare´
had very honestly sought for a demarkation of the zone
where it seemed to him that the use of probability theory
did not create a major problem. Hence the attempt to tackle
some fundamental questions in order to go beyond the
defects that Bertrand had ironically illustrated with his
famous paradoxes: Where is it legitimate to let randomness
intervene? What definition can be given of probability?
What mathematical techniques can be developed as useful
tools for physics, in particular for the kinetic theory of
gases? Borel would later write about Poincare´’s position on
this in [4].
In his 1907 text [24], Poincare´ accurately defined the
way in which he considered it legitimate to resort to the
notion of randomness. He saw essentially three origins of
randomness: the ignorance of a very small cause that we
cannot know but which produces a very important effect
(such as the so-called butterfly effect); the complexity of
the causes which prevents us from giving any explanation
other than a statistical one (as in the kinetic theory of
gases); the intervention of an unexpected cause that we
have neglected. This was not too far from the Laplacian
conception, which should not surprise us very much; Po-
incare´, born in 1854, was the child of a century in which
Laplace had been a tutelary figure. However, Poincare´
knew well the accusations accumulated against Laplace’s
theory and proposed several ways to adjust it: randomness,
even if is connected to our ignorance to a certain extent, is
not only that, and it is important to define the nature of the
connection between randomness and ignorance. The con-
ventionalist posture on which we have already commented
naturally made things easier, but Poincare´ did not seek
ease. As he wrote in 1899:
How shall we know that two possible cases are equally
probable? Will it be by virtue of a convention? If we state
an explicit convention at the beginning of each problem,
everything will be all right; we must only apply the rules of
arithmetic and algebra and we go until the end of the
computation and our result does not leave any place to
doubt. But, if we want to use it for any application, we need
to prove that our convention was legitimate, and we shall
face the difficulty we thought to have avoided.3
In a remarkably creative achievement, Poincare´ forged
a method allowing the objectification of some probabili-
ties. Using it, if one considers for instance a roulette
wheel with alternating black and red sectors, even without
having the slightest idea of how it is put into motion, one
may show it reasonable to suppose that after a large
number of turns, the probability that the ball stops in a
red zone (or a black one) is equal to 1/2. There are thus
3 ‘Comment saurons nous que deux cas possibles sont e´galement
probables? Sera-ce par une convention? Si nous plac¸ons au de´but de
chaque proble`me une convention explicite, tout ira bien; nous
n’aurons plus qu’a` appliquer les re`gles de l’arithme´tique et de
l’alge`bre et nous irons jusqu’au bout du calcul sans que notre re´sultat
puisse laisser place au doute. Mais, si nous voulons en faire la
moindre application, il faudra de´montrer que notre convention e´tait
le´gitime et nous nous retrouverons en face de la difficulte´ que nous
avions cru e´luder’ [20, p. 262].
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situations where one can go beyond the hazy Laplacian
principle of (in)sufficient reason as a necessary conven-
tion for determining the value of the probability. The
profound ‘method of arbitrary functions’, which is based
on the hypothesis that at the initial time the distribution of
the place where the ball stops is arbitrary and shows that
this distribution reaches an asymptotic equilibrium and
tends towards the uniform distribution, was certainly
Poincare´’s most important invention in the domain of
probability.
To conclude this survey, let us mention that in 1906,
when Poincare´ was completing his report for the Cour de
Cassation in the Dreyfus case, despite his standing as the
pre-eminent French authority in the theory of probability,
he was, as far as his scientific thought was concerned,
somewhat on the fence between a completely deterministic
description of the world and our modern conceptions where
randomness enters as a fundamental ingredient. Poincare´
maintained this uncomfortable position until the end of his
life. It is also worth noting that at the precise moment when
Borel—so strikingly!—was, so to speak, taking over, Po-
incare´ seems not to have been particularly interested in the
enterprises of his young follower. Nor was he had been
interested by the fortunate experiments of the unfortunate
Bachelier: he had written, it is true, a benevolent report on
his thesis [2] and had occasionally helped him to obtain
grants, but the two men had no scientific contact afterwards
[9]. Even more surprising, Poincare´ seems to have been
thoroughly unfamiliar with the works of the Russian
School (Chebyshev, Markov, Lyapounov, etc.); this
explains why he became never aware of some of their
connections with his own works. Poincare´’s probabilistic
studies therefore leave us with an impression of incom-
pleteness, partly due probably to his premature death at the
age of 58, but also to the singular situation of this last giant
of Newtonian-Laplacian science, who remained on the
threshold of the upheavals which occurred after his
departure.
Appendix: The Dreyfus Affair
Still suffering from the after-effects of the Franco-Prussian
war (1870–1871), the French Third Republic, divided
between pro-republicans and pro-monarchists, found itself
facing the infamous Dreyfus Affair. The case exploded in
1894 following the presumed treason by Alfred Dreyfus, a
captain in the French artillery, of Alsatian Jewish descent.
Dreyfus was accused of acting as a spy for the German
Empire, and after a trial that took place behind closed
doors, he was court-martialled and condemned for life to
hard labour. He was exiled to the penal colony of Devil’s
Island, in French Guiana.
The case was reopened in 1896 by Colonel Georges
Picquart, the new chief of the Army’s Office of Informa-
tion. Picquart presented a report to his superiors in which
Captain Dreyfus’s innocence was proved. Colonel Picquart
was removed from his office and sent to Tunisia. This gave
rise to a vehement outcry in the press in favour of Dreyfus.
Many radical intellectuals of the day supported the accused
captain, including the writer E´mile Zola, who published a
famous open letter in 1898 entitled ‘J’accuse!’ (I accuse!)
addressed to Fe´lix Faure, president of the French Republic,
in the literary journal L’Aurore. The French army respon-
ded by arresting Picquart and trying and convicting Zola
for defamation of the armed forces. This led to a violent
anti-Semitic campaign in the French press, with riots
breaking out against Jews, democrats and liberals.
Dreyfus was tried by another military court in Rennes in
1899, one in which a letter by Henri Poincare´ played an
important role. The atmosphere surrounding the trial was
heavy with pressure and threats to the judges and attorneys.
Dreyfus was condemned to 10 years, an extravagant con-
viction for ‘treason with extenuating circumstances’. In
reality, the baseless nature of the accusations had been
amply demonstrated during the course of the trial, but the
military court was under pressure from the French Army
(whose credibility had been seriously damaged by the
affair) to confirm the original conviction. The court’s
decision was not unanimous, but had a majority of five to
two.
To resolve the obvious injustice of the trial, Dreyfus was
offered the possibility to appeal for mercy, even though
this implied an admission of guilt. To avoid further polit-
ical and social tension, Dreyfus and his attorneys accepted
the proposal, and in 1898 Dreyfus was pardoned by the
President of the Republic, E´mile Loubet.
Complete exoneration of all charges finally arrived in
1906, following a final trial in which Poincare´’s interven-
tion was again significant. Dreyfus went on to fight for
France in World War I, and was made an officer in the
Le´gion d’honneur in 1919. He died in 1935.
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